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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Youngblood stands by the legal analysis, and its application to the 
instant dispute, that is set forth in his Opening Brief. He seeks to refrain from 
unnecessarily repeating the arguments, regarding the correctness of which he 
remains confident, that appear in that Brief. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. AUTO-OWNERS' BRIEF DEALS WITH THINGS 
THAT ARE REALLY NOT AT ISSUE. SUGGESTS 
A MISUNDERSTANDING OF PARTS OF 
MR. YOUNGBLOOD'S ARGUMENT. AND FAILS EVEN 
TO ATTEMPT TO COUNTER SIGNIFICANT PARTS OF 
HIS ARGUMENT. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
THE ESTOPPEL ISSUE. 
As the Court will observe, Auto-Owners' Brief deals substantially with 
things that are really not at issue. Mr. Youngblood has never, for example, 
contested the proposition that he was a pedestrian. Nor has he argued, either 
in the District Court proceedings or in this Appeal, that there is any ambiguity 
in the subject policy of insurance or that that policy, by its terms, provides 
coverage to him in the particulars of this situation. Nor has he argued waiver. 
Mr. Youngblood points out that Auto-Owners appears to have 
misunderstood part of his argument. He has not contended, and is not 
presently contending (contrary to the suggestion in Auto-Owners' Brief at 13-
14), that Auto-Owners' waiving its subrogation interest should work to estop 
Auto-Owners from denying coverage. He has brought the fact of Auto-
Owners' waiver of its subrogation interest to the Court's attention for 
background purposes and to make it abundantly clear that Auto-Owners was 
aware of the fact that the availability of u.i.m. coverage was important to him 
and that he would be pursuing a claim under that coverage. 
Another misconception under which Auto-Owners appears to labor (see 
its Brief at 13) has to do with Mr. Youngblood's settlement of his underlying tort 
claim. One of the things that Mr. Youngblood considered in connection with 
the question of whether he should accept policy limits or pursue the tortfeasor 
for assets beyond the $50,000 limits was the supposed availability of u.i.m. 
insurance coverage. The fact that he obtained policy limits from the liability 
carrier on the underlying claim does not somehow work to eviscerate or 
undermine his claim that Auto-Owners is estopped to deny him u.i.m. benefits. 
It underscores the validity of that claim. 
Also, Auto-Owners has mistakenly, at pages 8-9 of its Brief, 
characterized the subject representations of its agents as ones pertaining to 
"future facts." Semantics aside, it is clear that both representations, the first 
made by a sales representative and the second made by a claims adjuster, 
referred to coverage that was supposedly available (but that was not, in fact, 
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available) under the subject policy. See Fact 13, set forth at 7-8 of 
Mr. Youngblood's Opening Brief, and record references there cited. 
Mr. Youngblood's primary contention is that Auto-Owners is estopped, 
by reason of certain representations of its agents regarding the supposed 
existence of u.i.m. coverage for him as a pedestrian, to deny him coverage. In 
response to Mr. Youngblood's estoppel claim, Auto-Owners strongly relies, as 
it did in the District Court proceedings, on this Court's case of Perkins v. Great 
West Life Assurance Company. 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 1991). Auto-
Owners fails to reckon with Mr. Youngblood's analysis, set forth at 10-19 of his 
Opening Brief, that explains the difference between the situation in Perkins 
and the situation in this case and that discusses well-reasoned, persuasive 
case law from other jurisdictions. In those cases, as is the case here and as 
was not the case in Perkins, affirmative misrepresentations were made by 
insurance company representatives. 
Auto-Owners attempts to distinguish but does not persuasively 
distinguish the Utah Supreme Court's observations in Ellerbeck v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 227 P. 805, 808 (Utah 1924). Mr. Youngblood has brought that 
case to this Court's attention not because of its specific holding but because of 
its observation, quoted in Mr. Youngblood's Opening Brief at 10, regarding the 
importance, in Utah, of honesty and fair dealing in insurance relationships. 
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Auto-Owners does not even attempt to distinguish or explain away the 
significance of Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates. 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 
1987), and Berkeley Bank for Co-ops v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980), 
cases cited by Mr. Youngblood in his Opening Brief at 17 and 18. These 
cases all stand for the proposition that, as a matter of settled Utah 
jurisprudence, people and companies who misrepresent things do so at their 
peril. 
According to Mr. Youngblood's deposition testimony (R. 65-66; 76; 95-
105), which has not been refuted by Auto-Owners, specific representations 
were made regarding his being covered, as a pedestrian, that caused him to 
acquire the policy and that played a substantial role in his settling the 
underlying tort claim for liability policy limits. This Court very recently, in 
Larsen v. Exclusive Cars. Inc.. 2004 UT App. 259, in the course of its reversal 
of the trial court's summary rejection of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, 
restated the hornbook rule that what is contained within the four comers of a 
contract is not necessarily outcome-determinative. Questions of reasonable 
reliance on extra-contractual representations are, despite Auto-Owners' 
minimalistic argument to the contrary, worthy of serious judicial consideration 
in cases of claimed estoppel just as they are in claims of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. If Auto-Owners is correct in its analysis and if the rule of 
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Perkins is to be applied as broadly as Auto-Owners has argued it should be, 
people even less sophisticated than Mr. Youngblood, and even the mentally 
infirm, will be held to have no estoppel remedy, even in cases of the most 
egregious misrepresentations, if they, in reliance on pro-coverage 
misrepresentations by sloppy or unscrupulous insurance company 
representatives, do not read the language of their policies. Mr. Youngblood 
submits that that should not and cannot be the law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently defined what is meant by "public 
policy." In Hansen v. America Online, Inc.. 2004 UT 62, fl 12, that court 
explained: 
'Public policy' is the label we attach to those shared expectations and 
standards of conduct which have acquired both widespread and deeply 
held allegiance among the citizenry generally. 
There is no direct Supreme Court guidance on the question of whether 
this Court should accept the view of cases such as American Family Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Jefferv. 200 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12225 (S.D. Ind. 2000), and Harr v. 
Allstate Ins. Co.. 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969), discussed in Mr. Youngblood's 
Opening Brief at 13-16, that insurance companies should be estopped to deny 
coverage when their representatives make oral representations on which their 
insureds rely. But the analyses of those cases make sense, and this Court 
should follow the lead of those courts and the observations of the Utah 
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Supreme Court in Ellerbeck and Berkeley Bank and this Court in Conder and 
Larsen regarding the importance of honesty and fair dealing and in furtherance 
of the important public policy of holding persons and companies to their 
promises. 
This Court should reverse the District Court's granting of Auto-Owners' 
Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Mr. Youngblood's estoppel 
contention. 
B. TRIABLE QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST WITH RESPECT 
TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AUTO-OWNERS 
BREACHED ITS DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
MR. YOUNGBLOOD'S BAD-FAITH CLAIM. 
As pointed out by Mr. Youngblood in his Opening Brief at 19, the Utah 
Supreme Court, in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 801 
(Utah 1985), made it clear that an insurance company can be found liable to 
its insured, for breach of the company's duty of good faith and fair dealing, if its 
investigation of, evaluation of, and decision regarding a claim is not done 
"diligently," "fairly," and "promptly." In Utah, the question of whether an 
insurance company has discharged its duty of good faith and fair dealing is not 
necessarily dependent on the question of whether an insured is ultimately 
determined to be entitled to benefits under a policy. Beck makes it clear that it 
is the process and not just the result of an insurance company's handling of a 
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claim that is at the heart of the question of whether the insurance company 
has acted in good faith and diligently, fairly, and promptly. Mr. Youngblood 
submits that the Court should analyze this question separately from its 
analysis of the estoppel claim and should determine that the particulars of 
Auto-Owners' handling of Mr. Youngblood's claim (see Statement of Facts 
appearing at pages 5-8 of Mr. Youngblood's Opening Brief) presents triable 
questions of fact regarding Mr. Youngblood's bad-faith claim. A jury could 
reasonably find that Auto-Owners did not diligently investigate 
Mr. Youngblood's claim, did not fairly evaluate it, and/or did not reasonably 
promptly reach its ultimate determination. A jury could reasonably find that 
Auto-Owners did not treat Mr. Youngblood fairly in its overall processing of the 
claim. 
Mr. Youngblood through his counsel acknowledges that research has 
unearthed no case with facts similar to those of this case in which a court has 
held that a triable question of fact has been presented on the claim of breach 
of good faith and fair dealing. But Mr. Youngblood also points out that no 
contrary authority has been found. The reach of Beck v. Farmers is broad, 
and this Court should rule that the question of whether Auto-Owners breached 
its duty of good faith and fair dealing, in one or more particulars, is (analogous 
to, for example, the question of whether a defendant in a personal injury case 
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operated his motor vehicle in a negligent manner) a quintessential jury 
question. The Court should reverse the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment on Mr. Youngblood's bad-faith claim. 
If the Court rejects this part of Mr. Youngblood's analysis and holds, for 
whatever reason, that, as a matter of law, Auto-Owners did not breach its duty 
of good faith and fair dealing, the Court should nonetheless determine that 
triable questions of fact exist with respect to Mr. Youngblood's contention that 
Auto-Owners is estopped to deny coverage. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis and that set forth in his Opening Brief, 
Mr. Youngblood urges the Court to reverse the Summary Judgment in favor of 
Auto-Owners and to remand this case for jury trial. 
Respectfully submitted this J day of August, 2004. 
PETER" C. COLLINS 
PETER C. COLLINS, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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